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1Abstract
We consider the problem of dividing some amount of an in¯nitely
divisible and homogeneous resource among agents having claims on
this resource that cannot be jointly honored. A \rule" associates with
each such problem a feasible division. Our goal is to uncover the struc-
ture of the space of rules. For that purpose, we study \operators" on
the space, that is, mappings that associate to each rule another one.
Duality, claims truncation, attribution of minimal rights, and convex
combinations are the four operators we consider. We ¯rst establish a
number of results linking these operators, such as idempotence, com-
mutativity, and distributivity. Then, we determine which properties
of rules are preserved under each of these operators, and which are
not.
Key-words: Con°icting claims. Division rules. Operators. Minimal
rights. Maximal claims. Duality. Convexity.
JEL Classi¯cation numbers: C79-D63-D74.
21 Introduction
We address the problem of dividing some amount of an in¯nitely divisible
and homogeneous resource among agents having claims on this resource that
cannot be jointly honored. A primary example is when the liquidation value
of a bankrupt ¯rm has to be allocated among its creditors. A \division
rule" is a function that associates with each situation of this kind, which
we call a \claims problem", a division of the amount available. We call this
division an \awards vector". It is interpreted as the choice that a judge
or arbitrator could make. In the search for the most desirable rules, the
literature1, initiated by O'Neill (1982), has proceeded on several fronts, much
recent progress having been made on the axiomatic front.
We will consider the issue from a higher perspective than is standard
however, and examine the space of rules itself. Our goal is to uncover its
structure. When surveying the literature, one is struck by the richness of the
inventory of rules that have been proposed. This richness is also confusing
and one feels the need to put some order in the inventory, to organize it in
some fashion. Several approaches can be taken for this purpose. The ¯rst
approach simply consists in searching for resemblances between rules, in their
formulas and in the geometry of their graphs. Rules can be usefully organized
in families exploiting these resemblances. The parametric family introduced
by Young (1987), as well as certain families de¯ned by Thomson (2000),
collect a number of important rules that can be described in a common way.
The identi¯cation of these families allows us to relate rules to one another
and also to understand what is unique to each of them. A second approach is
to organize rules by means of the properties they share. Axiomatic analysis is
the principal methodology here. Of course, these two approaches are related.
The general formulas that one writes down to gather rules among which one
has recognized patterns will often cause all members of the family to share
certain properties.
The approach we follow here is based on a third way of \connecting" rules.
It exploits and generalizes a phenomenon one quickly notices, namely that
one can often pass from a rule to another by means of a simple algebraic
or geometric operation. Let us de¯ne an \operator" on the space of rules
as a mapping that associates with each rule another one. We propose to
undertake a systematic study of such objects. We consider four of them. First
1For a survey, see Thomson (2003).
1is a duality operator. When looking at a claims problem, two perspectives
can be taken: we can think of the issue as dividing what is available; or,
as dividing this de¯cit (the di®erence between the sum of the claims and
the amount to divide). Let S be a rule. The rule associated with S by
the duality operator, its \dual", treats what is available in the same way as
S treats what is missing. The second operator associates with S the rule
de¯ned for each problem by ¯rst truncating claims at the amount to divide
and then applying S to the problem so revised. The rule associated with S
by the third operator calculates the awards vector for each problem in two
steps: ¯rst, each claimant is attributed the di®erence between the amount to
divide and the sum of the claims of the other agents (or 0 if this di®erence
is negative); this di®erence is an obvious minimum to which he is entitled;
second, S is applied to allocate what remains, the part that is truly contested,
claims being adjusted down by the \minimal rights" of the ¯rst step. The
last operator di®ers from the others as its arguments are lists of rules and
weights for the rules: it produces the weighted average of the rules.2
We establish a number of results linking the four operators. Obviously
the duality operator composed with itself is the identity; also the claims
truncation operator composed with itself is equivalent to itself; somewhat
less obvious is that a similar statement holds for the attribution of minimal
rights operator. We then show that if two rules are dual, then the version of
one obtained by subjecting it to the attribution of minimal rights operator
is dual to the version of the other obtained by subjecting it to the claims
truncation operator. Next, we study the composition of the claims truncation
and attribution of minimal rights operators (a composition on which a rule
suggested by Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs, 1987, is based). We show that the
order in which they are composed does not matter: the rule that results is
independent of the order. Second, in the two-claimant case, starting from
any two rules satisfying the basic property that claimants having equal claims
should receive equal amounts, subjecting them to the composition of the two
operators always produces the same rule. Third, this rule is not just any
rule, but it is one that has been central in the literature. We refer to it as
\concede-and-divide" because it emerges from the following natural two-step
scenario: each claimant ¯rst concedes to the other the di®erence between the
amount to divide and his own claim (or 0 if this di®erence is negative); what
remains, the part that we described earlier as being truly contested, is divided
2There is one operator for each choice of a weight vector.
2equally (Aumann and Maschler, 1985). Finally, we show that the convexity
operator is distributive with respect to each of the other three operators.
Given a property that a rule may have, a natural question is whether
the property is also enjoyed by the rule obtained by subjecting it to a cer-
tain operator. The fact that a property is preserved under an operator is an
interesting and very useful feature it may have. We show that, of the proper-
ties that have been frequently discussed in the literature, most are preserved
under the duality operator, but our main results concerning this operator
pertain to two basic monotonicity properties, which somewhat surprisingly,
are not. One is \claims monotonicity": if an agent's claim increases, his
award should be at least as large as it was initially. The other is \population
monotonicity": upon the arrival of additional claimants, the award to each
claimant initially present should be at most as large as it was initially.
Next, we turn to the claims truncation and attribution of minimal rights
operators. These operators tend to be more disruptive, but they are disrup-
tive in \symmetric" ways. We also study their composition and ¯nd that the
central property of \self-duality"|invariance under the duality operator|
which is preserved by neither operator, is preserved under their composition.
The convexity operator preserves most properties, but not all, and we
give two important examples of properties that are not preserved. One is
\consistency", which says that the choice made for each problem should
always be in agreement with the choice made for the problem derived from it
by imagining that some claimants leave with their awards, and reevaluating
the situation from the viewpoint of the remaining claimants. The second
property is \converse consistency", which says that a certain awards vector
should be chosen for a problem if for each two-claimant subgroup of the
claimants it involves, its restriction to that subgroup is chosen for the problem
these claimants face when the complementary group of claimants leave with
their awards.
Our results have a number of bene¯ts. First, as was our goal, they allow us
to structure the existing inventory of rules available to solve claims problems,
and to help ensure that no important rule has been missed. The structural
relations between the operators we uncover also allow us to provide easy
proofs that certain properties hold for particular rules (examples are the
properties established by Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs, 1987, for the rule they
de¯ne), and they should also be useful in identifying which properties each
newly constructed rule may or may not satisfy. Finally, the operators|
3the duality operator is particularly useful in this regard|allow us to derive
new characterizations from existing ones. (For an earlier example of such a
derivation, see Herrero and Villar, 2001). Altogether, we believe that they
help clarify the existing literature, and that they will provide useful tools to
keep it organized as it develops further.
2 Model
There is a ¯nite set of claimants, N. Each agent i 2 N has a claim ci 2 R+
over an amount to divide E 2 R+. This amount is insu±cient to honor




N ci ¸ E.3 Let CN denote the class of all claims problems.
An awards vector of (c;E) is a point of RN
+ bounded above by c and
whose coordinates add up to E, a condition we call \e±ciency". Let X(c;E)
be the set of awards vectors of (c;E). A rule is a function de¯ned on CN
that associates with each (c;E) 2 CN an awards vector of (c;E). Let S
be our generic notation for rules. For the two-claimant case, a rule can be
conveniently described in a two-dimensional space by representing, for each
claims vector, the path followed by the awards vector as the amount to divide
increases from 0 to the sum of the claims. We refer to this path as the path
of awards of the rule for this claims vector. We denote by p(S;c) the
path of awards of S for c.
We also consider a variable-population version of the model. There is a
population of \potential" claimants, either N, the set of natural numbers, or
some subset of it. However, only a ¯nite number of claimants are present at
any given time. Let N be the class of ¯nite subsets of the set of potential
claimants. To specify a claims problem, we ¯rst choose N 2 N, then (c;E) 2
CN. A rule is a function de¯ned over [N2NCN, which associates with each
N 2 N and each (c;E) 2 CN, an awards vector of (c;E).
3 Operators
Next, we de¯ne the four operators with which we are concerned. They are
the duality operator, Od, the claims truncation operator, Ot, the attribution
3By the notation RN we mean the Cartesian product of jNj copies of R indexed by the
members of N. Vector inequalities: x = y, x ¸ y, and x > y.
4of minimal rights operator, Om, and the convexity operator, Oc. Then, we
illustrate by means of several examples. Given any rule S, the rule obtained
by subjecting it to operator Op is denoted Sp.
1. Duality. The dual of a rule S treats what is available for division in
the same way as S treats what is missing. Formally, given (c;E) 2 CN, we
replace E by
P
ci ¡E; we use S to divide this di®erence, and then subtract
the result from c. The idea is suggested by Aumann and Maschler (1985),
who provide motivation for it, as well as note passages in the Talmud to
support their thesis that its seed was already there:
Dual of S, Sd: For each (c;E) 2 CN, Sd(c;E) ´ c ¡ S(c;
P
ci ¡ E).
It is easy to check that the pair (c;
P
ci¡E) is a well-de¯ned problem and
that Sd is a well-de¯ned rule. The operator Od has a geometric interpretation
that is particularly convenient: for each c 2 RN
+, p(S;c) and p(Sd;c) are
symmetric of each other with respect to c
2. Also, since, as formally stated
below (Theorem 1), (Sd)d = S, we can speak of rules being \dual" of each
other. Examples of dual rules are the constrained equal awards rule,
CEA, which equates the amounts received by all claimants subject to no
one receiving more than his claim, and the constrained equal losses rule,
CEL, which equates the losses experienced by all claimants subject to no
one receiving a negative amount: formally, CEA(c;E) ´ (minfci;®g)i2N,
and CEL(c;E) ´ (maxf0;ci ¡®g)i2N, where in each case, ® 2 R+ is chosen
so as to achieve e±ciency. Figure 1a illustrates the de¯nitions, and this
duality, for jNj = 2.4
A rule is self-dual if it treats the problem of dividing what is avail-
able symmetrically to the problem of dividing what is missing (Aumann and
Maschler, 1985).5 To say that a rule is self-dual is to say that it is invariant
under Od. For such a rule S, and for each c 2 RN
+, p(S;c) is symmetric with
respect to c
2. A number of rules are self-dual. An obvious example is the
proportional rule, P, which chooses awards proportional to claims: for-
mally, for each (c;E) 2 CN, P(c;E) ´ ®c, where ® 2 R+ is chosen so as to
achieve e±ciency. However, other important rules share this property. One
of them is the Talmud rule, Tal, (Aumann and Maschler, 1985), which can
4We write the formal de¯nitions of rules for the ¯xed-population case. To obtain their
variable-population versions, it su±ces to add a universal quanti¯cation over N.
5Aumann and Maschler (1985) note a number of passages in the Talmud where the














































Figure 1: Illustrating the four operators. (a) The operator Od applied to
CEA produces CEL: for each c 2 RN
+, p(CEA;c) and p(CEL;c) are symmetric
of each other with respect to c
2. (b) The operator Ot applied to P. (c) The
operator Om applied to P. (d) The operator Oc with equal weights, applied to
CEA and CEL, produces the simple average of these rules, Av.




each claim being ¯rst divided by two; the latter is used for the remaining
cases, here too, c
2 being used in the formula. Another is the random arrival
rule, RA (O'Neill, 1982; see Thomson, 1998, for a proof), which assigns to
each claimant the expected value of what he would obtain on a ¯rst-come
¯rst-serve basis, assuming that all orders of arrival of claimants occur with
equal probabilities.6
2. Claims truncation. The second operator truncates claims: given
(c;E) 2 CN, each claim that is greater than E is replaced by E. The
operator Ot is critical for the study of claims problems as \games with
transferable utility" (O'Neill, 1982). Indeed, if a rule is such that for each
problem, the awards vector it recommends is the payo® vector chosen by a
solution to TU games for the game associated with the problem in the man-
ner ¯rst suggested by O'Neill (1982)7, then it is invariant under Ot (Curiel,
6For references to the relevant ancient literature, see O'Neill (1982), Aumann and
Maschler (1985), Young (1987), and Dagan (1996). Both CEA and CEL are discussed by
Maimonides. Proportionality is explicitly advocated by Aristotle as the basis for \just"
distribution. The Talmud rule is de¯ned by Aumann and Maschler (1985) to rationalize
numerical examples given in the Talmud. We should also mention the \minimal overlap
rule", MO, (O'Neill, 1982), which calculates awards by arranging claims over the amount
to divide so as to minimize in a lexicographic way the extent to which they con°ict, and
then dividing each unit equally among all agents claiming it. Remarkably, RA, MO, and
Tal all coincide for jNj = 2; moreover, they coincide with \concede-and-divide", de¯ned
below. For further discussion of these relationships, see Thomson (2003). We will see
below that many other rules share this feature.
7Given (c;E) 2 CN, and S µ N, the \worth of S" is de¯ned to be maxfE ¡ P
i2NnS ci;0g. \Correspondences" between rules and solutions to coalitional games have
proved to be very useful tools in the literature on the problem of claims resolution.
6Maschler and Tijs, 1987). Formally, for each (c;E) 2 CN and each i 2 N, let
ti(c;E) ´ minfci;Eg denote agent i's truncated claim at the amount to
divide, and t(c;E) ´ (ti(c;E))i2N the vector of truncated claims. Figure 1b
illustrates Ot applied to P for jNj = 2.
Rule S operated from truncated claims, St: For each (c;E) 2 CN,
St(c;E) ´ S (t(c;E);E).
The inequality between
P
ci and E is not reversed by the truncation:
after carrying it out, we still have a well-de¯ned claims problem.
If a rule is invariant under Ot, we say that it is invariant under claims
truncation: then, for each (c;E) 2 CN, one can equivalently calculate the
awards vector (i) directly, or (ii) after truncating claims at E (Dagan, 1996).
3. Attribution of minimal rights. Given (c;E) 2 CN and i 2 N, it
is natural to think of the di®erence E ¡
P
Nnfig cj, (or 0 if this di®erence
is negative), as a minimal amount that he can reasonably expect. There
should be no dispute about this payment. Given any rule S, a version of it
can be de¯ned by ¯rst attributing to each claimant his minimal amount; then
after adjusting all claims down by these \¯rst-round awards", applying S to
divide the remainder. This remainder is what is truly disputed. Formally,
for each (c;E) 2 CN and each i 2 N, let mi(c;E) ´ maxfE ¡
P
Nnfig cj;0g
denote claimant i's minimal right and m(c;E) ´ (mi(c;E))i2N the vector
of minimal rights. Figure 1c illustrates the operator Om applied to P for
jNj = 2.
Rule S operated from minimal rights, Sm: For each (c;E) 2 CN,





mi(c;E) ¸ 0 (Curiel, Maschler and Tijs, 1987), and
P
(ci ¡
mi(c;E)) ¸ E ¡
P
mi(c;E), here too, at the second round, we obtain a
well-de¯ned claims problem.
If a rule is invariant under Om, we say that it satis¯es minimal rights
¯rst: then, for each problem, one can equivalently calculate the awards
vector (i) directly, or (ii) in two steps, ¯rst attributing to each claimant his
\minimal right", and after adjusting down each agent's claim by his minimal
right, dividing what remains (Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs, 1987).
4. Convexity. Our ¯nal operator takes several arguments, but we will
refer to it in the singular. When two rules express opposite viewpoints on
7how to solve a claims problem, it is natural to compromise between them
by averaging. More generally, we consider a °exible formulation that allows
arbitrary convex combinations. Let K be a ¯nite index set and ¢K the
unit simplex in the jKj-dimensional Euclidean space. Let (Sk)k2K be a list
of rules, and (¸k)k2K a vector of weights in ¢K. Figure 1d illustrates the
operator Oc with equal weights applied to CEA and CEL for jNj = 2.
Weighted average of rules (Sk)k2K with weights (¸k)k2K 2 ¢K,
w((Sk)k2K;(¸k)k2K): For each (c;E) 2 CN, w((Sk)k2K;(¸k)k2K)(c;E) ´ P
k2K ¸kSk(c;E).
That Oc is well-de¯ned is a direct consequence of the fact that the set of
awards vectors is a convex set.
4 Relating the operators
The following theorem describes the result of composing each of the ¯rst
three operators with itself. It uses the following notation, which appears
repeatedly in the sections to follow. Given any rule S, the rule obtained
by subjecting it to the operator Op and then to the operator Op0 is denoted
Sp0±p.8
Theorem 1 For each rule S, we have Sd±d = S, St±t = St, and Sm±m = Sm.
Proof: The statement concerning Od is obtained by straightforward manip-
ulation of the de¯nitions.9 We omit the obvious proof of the second state-
ment. To prove the last statement, let (c;E) 2 CN. We need to show that,
in the problem obtained from (c;E) by attributing minimal rights, namely
(c¡m(c;E);E ¡
P
mj(c;E)), minimal rights are all 0. Let i 2 N, and note







After canceling out terms, we obtain the expression
8We ¯nd this notation a little easier in formulas than Op
0
± Op(S).





which is easily seen to be equal to 0, by using the de¯nition of mi(c;E). ¤
For jNj = 2, straightforward calculations reveal that CEA subjected
to Om and CEL subjected to Ot are dual. Indeed, they both coincide
with concede-and-divide, CD. This rule is de¯ned only for jNj = 2
but it is very important because a large number of ways of looking at the
problem of adjudicating con°icting claims lead to it.10 Formally, setting








2 ). This duality result is not an accident. It is a consequence
of the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Let S and R be two dual rules. Then Sm and Rt are dual too.
Proof: We need to show that for each (c;E) 2 CN, Sm(c;E) = c ¡
Rt(c;
P











Since S is dual to R,

















10The following scenario, which provided the reason for the name we chose for the rule, is
one of them (Aumann and Maschler, 1985): agent i, by claiming ci, is implicitly conceding
to claimant j the di®erence E¡ci, or 0 if this di®erence is negative, namely maxfE¡ci;0g.
Similarly, by claiming cj, agent j can be understood as conceding maxfE ¡cj;0g to agent
i. Let us ¯rst attribute to each claimant the amount conceded to him by the other (this
can be done because the sum of these concessions is at most as large as the amount to
divide), and in a second step let us divide the remainder, the \contested part", equally
(no agent ends up with more than his claim).











We prove this equality by showing that for each i 2 N, ci ¡ mi(c;E) =
t(c;
P
N ci ¡ E), or equivalently that









Nnfig cj, then maxfE ¡
P
Nnfig cj;0g = 0 and the left-hand side
of (¤¤) is ci; the right-hand side is also ci. If
P
Nnfig cj < E, the left-hand
side of (¤¤) is ci ¡ E +
P
Nnfig cj = ¡E +
P
N cj, and so is the right-hand
side.
¤
We give two other illustrations of Theorem 2 for jNj = 2. First, an
implication of this theorem is that if a rule S is such that Sm is self-dual and
R ´ Sd, then Rt = Sm. This is what occurs for Piniles' rule, Pin, which is
de¯ned, for each (c;E) 2 CN, by applying CEA when E ·
P
ci
2 , but using in
the formula c
2 instead of c itself; then, doing so again when
P
ci
2 < E ·
P
ci.
Then, each award is in two \installments".11 Formally, if
ci
2 ¸ E, Pin(c;E) ´
(minf
ci




2 ;®g)i2N, where in
each case, ® 2 R+ is chosen so as to achieve e±ciency. The rule is represented
for jNj = 2 in Figure 2b and its dual in Figure 2e. It is easy to calculate
that for jNj = 2, Pinm = CD (Figure 2a). Since CD is self-dual, Theorem 2
implies that Pint±d = CD, as is also easily veri¯ed (Figure 2d).
As a ¯nal illustration of Theorem 2, once again we consider Pin for
jNj = 2, but this time we subject it to Ot. The resulting rule is shown in
Figure 2c. The rule obtained by subjecting Pind to Om is shown in Figure 2f.
For each c 2 RN
+ the symmetry of p(Pint;c) and p(Pinm±d;c) announced by
Theorem 2 can be veri¯ed on panels (c) and (f).
When a rule is subjected to both Ot and Om, the question arises whether
the order in which these operators are applied matters. It is an important
11Piniles' (1861) rule, de¯ned below, is an only partially successful attempt to explain
the recommendations made in the Talmud for the numerical examples given there. On the
other hand, the rule obtained from Pin by subjecting it to Ot is not self-dual. We return













































































Figure 2: Illustrating Theorem 2. (a) Piniles' rule subjected to Om.
(b) Piniles' rule. (c) Piniles' rule subjected to Ot. (d) The dual of Piniles' rule sub-
jected to Ot. (e) The dual of Piniles' rule. (f) The dual of Piniles' rule subjected
to Om. The dual of each rule represented in the top row is the rule represented
just underneath.
11question since neither order appears more compelling than the other. Fortu-
nately, the answer is no. We give the proof of this invariance ¯rst for jNj = 2,
as it is very transparent, and also because then, not only is the resulting rule
independent of the order, but it is also independent of which rule is taken
as a starting point, provided the rule assigns equal awards to agents with
equal claims. This is the property of equal treatment of equals: for each
(c;E) 2 CN and each pair fi;jg µ N, if ci = cj, then Si(c;E) = Sj(c;E).
Moreover, the end-result is CD. This feature of CD is in fact one of the
reasons why we feel that this rule is so important.
A preliminary observation is worth making: after being subjected to Ot,
any rule satisfying equal treatment of equals chooses equal division if the
amount to divide is at most as large as the smallest claim. Also, under Om,
for a rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, if the amount to divide is at
least as large as the sum of the n¡1 largest claims, all claimants experience
equal losses.
Theorem 3 For jNj = 2. For each rule S satisfying equal treatment of
equals, St±m = Sm±t = CD.
Proof: We assume, without loss of generality, that c1 · c2.
Case 1: E · c1. The amount conceded to each claimant (also his minimal
right) is 0. First-round awards are all 0, and no adjustment of claims is
needed. Truncation of claims at E yields revised claims both equal to E. By
equal treatment of equals, equal division prevails.
Case 2: c1 < E · c2. Claimant 1 concedes to claimant 2 the amount E¡c1,
and claimant 2 concedes nothing to claimant 1. Claims are adjusted down to
c1 and c2 ¡(E ¡c1). After these ¯rst-round awards, what remains to divide
is c1. Truncating claims at c1 yields new claims both equal to c1. In this
second round, by equal treatment of equals, each claimant receives half of the
amount that remains available, namely
c1
2 . Altogether, claimant 1 receives
c1
2 and claimant 2 whatever is left.
Case 3: c2 < E. The amounts conceded are E ¡ c2 and E ¡ c1. Claims are
adjusted down to c1¡(E¡c2) and c2¡(E¡c1), and the amount that remains
available is E ¡
P
(E ¡ ci). After truncation at this revised amount, claims
are equal (and in fact, equal to the revised amount to divide c1 + c2 ¡ E).
Then, in this second round, by equal treatment of equals, equal division of
what remains prevails.
12It is easy to see that the awards made in each of the three cases are those
speci¯ed by CD, and that reversing the order in which the two operators are
composed also yields CD. ¤
If in Theorem 3, equal treatment of equals is dropped, order indepen-
dence still holds but now a family of rules is obtained (de¯ned in Hokari and
Thomson, 2003). If the rule is such that multiplying all data of a problem by
some positive number results in a problem whose awards vector is obtained
from the awards vector of the original problem by the same multiplication
(see below for a more formal statement of this property of \homogeneity"),
a one-parameter subfamily is obtained. In the general n-claimant case, we
lose uniqueness also, but not order independence.
Theorem 4 For each rule S, we have Sm±t = St±m.
Proof: The proof is in three steps. Let (c;E) 2 CN be given.
Step 1: m(c;E) = m(t(c;E);E).
Let i 2 N. If there is j 2 Nnfig such that cj ¸ E, then mi(c;E) = 0.
Also, tj(c;E) = E, so mi(t(c;E);E) = 0. Thus, mi(c;E) = mi(t(c;E);E). If
for each j 2 Nnfig, cj < E, then for each j 2 Nnfig, tj(c;E) = cj, and thus,
mi(t(c;E);E) ´ maxfE ¡
P




Step 2: t(c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
P
mi (c;E)) = t(c;E) ¡ m(t(c;E);E).
By Step 1, we only need to show that for each i 2 N,
ti
³




= ti (c;E) ¡ mi (c;E) (Relation Ri.)
Using the de¯nitions of t(¢;¢) and m(¢;¢), Relation Ri reads:




















13If, for each h 2 N n fig, E ¡
P
Nnfhg cj · 0, the desired conclusion follows
directly. Otherwise, there is h¤ 2 N n fig such that E ¡
P
Nnfh¤g cj > 0.



































Hence, both left and right hand sides of (¤) are equal to ci.
Step 3: Conclusion. Using Step 2 and Step 1 in turn, we obtain,
S












= m(c;E) + S
³





= m(t(c;E);E) + S
³







It is natural to ask what would happen if the operators Ot and Om were
reapplied. The answer is: nothing. We have already noted that once minimal
rights are attributed, claims adjusted down by the minimal rights, and the
amount to divide adjusted down by the sum of the minimal rights, the mini-
mal rights of the problem that results are all 0. In other words, the minimal
rights in (c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
P
mj(c;E)) are all 0 (Theorem 1). But consider
the problem obtained from the above by truncating claims at the amount to
















we assert that minimal rights are still all 0. Formally:
14Proposition 1 For each (c;E) 2 CN, consider the problem obtained from it
by attributing minimal rights, revising claims down by these minimal rights
and the amount to divide down by the sum of the minimal rights. Then, after
claims truncation, minimal rights are all 0.
Proof: We need to show that for each i 2 N, mi(c0;E0) ´ maxfE0 ¡ P
Nnfig c0
j;0g = maxfE0 ¡
P
Nnfig tj(c ¡ m(c;E);E0);0g = 0. Replacing E0






tj(c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
X
mk(c;E));
and using the equality established in the proof of Theorem 4 (Relation Ri),
tj(c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
X
mk(c;E)) = tj(c;E) ¡ mj(c;E);
showing that E ¡ mi(c;E) ·
P





To prove (¤) , we distinguish two cases.
Case 1: there is j 2 Nnfig such that cj ¸ E. Then the left-hand side of (¤)
is at most equal to 0, whereas the right-hand side is 0. The desired inequality
is satis¯ed.
Case 2: there is no such j. Then the left-hand side of (¤) is equal to
E¡
P
Nnfig cj and the right-hand side is the maximum of that same expression
and 0. Once again, the desired inequality is satis¯ed.
¤
Thanks to Theorem 4, we conclude that parallel statements can be made
when Ot and Om are applied in reverse order.
Our ¯nal result in this section relates Oc to the other three operators.
We omit its proof, which follows directly from the de¯nitions.
Theorem 5 The convexity operator is distributive with respect to each of the
claims truncation, attribution of minimal rights, and duality operators:
For each (Sk)k2K and each (¸k)k2K,
15t m d
t t (Thm 1) t ± m (Thm 4) m ± d (Thm 2)
m m ± t (Thm 4) m (Thm 1) t ± d (Thm 2)
d d ± m (Thm 2) d ± t (Thm 2) id (Thm 1)
Table 1: Summary table relating operators. The result of applying the
operator indexing a row and then the operator indexing a column is indicated at
the intersection of the row and the column. To illustrate, the composition m±t, in
the (t;m) cell, is shown in that cell to be the equivalent to the t ± m composition.











Similar formulas hold with either the minimal rights or duality operators
replacing the claims truncation operator.12
Table 1 here.
5 Preservation of properties under operators
In this section we undertake a systematic investigation of which properties are
preserved under the operators de¯ned in the previous section. The properties
we consider have a straightforward interpretation, and to save space we refer
readers to earlier literature for motivation and formal de¯nitions. For the
same reason, we do not consider properties that have been less frequently
discussed.13 We apologize for the enumeration, which nevertheless has the
advantage of gathering all the material we need. Formal de¯nitions can be
found in Thomson (2003). The proofs are available from the authors upon
request.
Order preservation (Aumann and Maschler, 1985): if agent i's claim
is at least as large as agent j's claim, his award should be at least as large
as agent j's award; also, his loss should be at least as large as agent j's
12We use superscripts either to indicate an operator or a number, but the context always
makes it clear which is intended.
13Additional results are listed in Thomson (2005b).
16loss; group order preservation (Thomson, 1998; Chambers and Thomson,
2002): given two groups of claimants, if the aggregate claim of the ¯rst group
is at least as large as the aggregate claim of the second group, similar in-
equalities should hold between the aggregate award of the two groups, as well
as between the aggregate loss incurred by the two groups; anonymity: any
\renaming" of claimants should be accompanied by a parallel reassignment
of awards; homogeneity: if claims and amount to divide are multiplied by
the same positive number, so should all awards; and continuity: the awards
vector should be a continuous function of the data of the problem.
Next are monotonicity properties. They are claims monotonicity: if
an agent's claim increases, his award should be at least as large as it was
initially; resource monotonicity: if the amount to divide increases, each
claimant's award should be at least as large as it was initially.14
Our next group consists of invariance properties. First is no advanta-
geous transfer (Moulin, 1987; Ju, Miyagawa, and Sakai, 2004): no group
of claimants should receive more in the aggregate as a result of redistribut-
ing their claims among themselves. Two \composition" properties follow. If
the amount to divide decreases from some initial value, this decrease can be
dealt with in either one of two ways: (i) by canceling the initial division and
recalculating the awards for the ¯nal amount; (ii) by taking the awards calcu-
lated on the basis of the initial amount as claims in dividing the ¯nal amount.
Composition down (Moulin, 2000a) says that (i) and (ii) should result in
the same awards vector. Now, suppose that instead, the amount to divide
increases from some initial value. Here too, we can handle this increase in
either one of two ways: (i) by canceling the initial division and simply recal-
culating the awards for the ¯nal amount; (ii) by letting claimants keep their
initial awards, revising their claims down by these awards, and reapplying
the rule to divide the incremental amount (the di®erence between the ¯nal
and initial amounts). Composition up (Young, 1987) says that (i) and (ii)
should give the same awards vector.
We close with several properties pertaining to the variable-population
version of the model. Population monotonicity (Thomson, 1983): if new
claimants arrive, the award to each of the claimants initially present should be
at most as large as it was initially;15 replication invariance (for a study of
14For the \inequality conditions", a \strict" version is obtained by requiring that the
conclusion should be strict if the inequality appearing in the hypothesis is strict.
15For a survey of the literature on population monotonicity, see Thomson (1995).
17the idea in this context, see Chun and Thomson, 2005): the awards vector of
a replica problem should be the replica of the awards vector of the problem
that is replicated (in the k-replica of a problem, each claimant has k ¡ 1
clones with claims equal to his and the amount to divide is multiplied by
k); consistency (Young, 1987, is the author of the most general results on
the subject16): if some claimants leave with their awards and the problem
of dividing among the remaining claimants what is left is considered, these
claimants should receive the same awards as was decided initially; converse
consistency (see Chun, 1999, and Thomson, 2005a, for discussions of the
property in this context): suppose that an awards vector x is such that its
restriction to each two-claimant group is chosen for the problem of dividing
between them the sum of their components of x; then, x should be chosen.
We say that a property is preserved under an operator if whenever
a rule satis¯es it, so does the rule obtained by subjecting to the operator.
In the following pages, we discuss which properties are preserved under our
operators, and which are not. The results are summarized in Table 2. We
omit most proofs. The appendix contains the proofs of those results that
are more di±cult or from which a lesson can be drawn. For the remaining
properties, the proofs are available from the authors upon request.
1. Duality operator. The properties that are preserved under the duality
operator are numerous. We say that two properties are dual if whenever
a rule satis¯es one of them, its dual satis¯es the other. A simple example of
a pair of dual properties are the two parts of order preservation. This is most
easily seen for jNj = 2, thanks to the convenient geometric interpretation of
self-duality. Let N ´ f1;2g and c 2 RN
+ be such that c1 · c2, say. Then,
p(S;c) is above the 45± line (the ¯rst part of order preservation) if and only
if p(Sd;c) lies below the line of slope 1 emanating from c (the second part of
order preservation). A property is self-dual if it is preserved under Od.
Two basic monotonicity properties are not preserved under the duality
operator, and we state their duals, to show how one performs this operation.
First is claims monotonicity. Its dual says that if an agent's claim and
the amount to divide increase by the same amount °, this claimant's award
should not increase by more than °.17 Indeed, let i 2 N, and note that Si(ci+
°;c¡i;E) ¸ Si(c;E) is equivalent to ci + ° ¡ Sd
i (ci + °;c¡i;
P
cj + ° ¡ E) ¸
16For a survey of the literature on consistency and its converse, see Thomson (2005a).
17This property is independently formulated by Moulin (2000b) for a discrete version of




cj¡E).18 After canceling out ci from both sides of this inequality
and replacing
P




Second is population monotonicity. Its dual says that if new claimants
arrive and the amount to divide increases by an amount equal to the sum
of their claims, then the award to none of the claimants initially present
should decrease. Indeed, for each N0 ½ N, and each i 2 N0, the inequality







N cj¡E). After canceling out ci from both sides of the inequality
sign and introducing E0 ´
P
N0 cj ¡ E, we obtain that for each i 2 N0,
Sd




2. Claims truncation and minimal rights operators. Many properties
are preserved under Ot. Having at hand such a list, the concept of duality of
properties, together with the following theorem, allows us to easily determine
which properties are preserved under Om. The only properties whose case
cannot be settled by invoking these theorems are claims monotonicity and
population monotonicity, and direct proofs are needed (see the Appendix).
Theorem 6 A property is preserved under Ot if and only if its dual is pre-
served under Om.
Proof: Let A be a property that is preserved under Ot, Ad its dual, and let
S be a rule satisfying Ad. We need to show that Sm satis¯es Ad. Since A is
dual to Ad, Sd satis¯es A. Since A is preserved under Ot, St±d satis¯es A.
Since Ad is dual to A, Sd±t±d satis¯es Ad. We will show that Sd±t±d = Sm.
Recall that Theorem 2 asserts that if R is the dual of S, then Rt is the
dual of Sm. Thus, Rd±t = Sm. Since R = Sd, then Sd±t±d = Sm.
We have therefore shown that Sd±t±d = Sm, and since Sd±t±d was assumed
to satisfy Ad, so does Sm. This completes the proof of the theorem in one
direction.
We omit the \dual" proof for the other direction. ¤
Theorem 6 suggests an additional de¯nition: two operators are dual
if whenever a property is preserved under the ¯rst one, the dual property is
preserved under the second one. According to this de¯nition, Ot and Om are
dual.
18The notation c¡i designates the vector c from which the i-th coordinate has been
deleted and (c0
i;c¡i) the vector c in which the i-th coordinate has been replaced by c0
i.
193. Composition of the claims truncation and attribution of minimal
rights operators. The next theorem says that the composition of Ot and
Om preserves duality of rules (according to Theorem 4, the operators can be
composed in either order):
Theorem 7 If two rules are dual, the versions of the rules obtained by trun-
cating claims ¯rst and then attributing minimal rights are also dual.
Proof: Let S and R be a pair of dual rules. By Theorem 2, St and Rm are
dual too. Applying Theorem 2 to this second pair, we deduce that Sm±t and
Rt±m are dual. By Theorem 4, Rt±m = Rm±t. Thus, Sm±t and Rm±t are dual
(and of course, so are St±m and Rt±m). ¤
If a property is preserved under both Ot and Om separately, then clearly
it is preserved under their composition. However, a property may be pre-
served under neither of these operators and yet be preserved under their
composition. An example is self-duality, for which we obtain the following
result, which is a corollary of Theorem 7.
Corollary 1 If a rule is self-dual, the version of the rule obtained by trun-
cating claims ¯rst and then attributing minimal rights is also self-dual.
Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987) take P as a starting point and de¯ne
a new rule from it by ¯rst attributing minimal rights and then truncating
claims. They show that their rule is self-dual by invoking a game-theoretic
argument. Since P is self-dual, this result can be obtained as an application
of Corollary 1.
Typically however, when a property is preserved by neither Ot nor Om, it
is not recovered by their composition. To illustrate, consider resource mono-
tonicity. The rule CEA is resource monotonic but CEAm is not. Neither is
CEAt±m, which coincides with it: indeed, since this rule is invariant under
claims truncation, CEAm±t = CEAm.
Consistency is another example of a property that is not preserved under
the composition of Ot and Om. To see this, recall that this property is not
preserved under Om (Table 2). This can be proved by means of P, but CEA
could have been used to make the point.
This reasoning can be applied more generally. Consider a property that
can be shown not to be preserved under Om by means of a rule that satis¯es
invariance under claims truncation. Then the property is not preserved under
20the composition of Ot and Om. Also, consider a property that can be shown
not to be preserved under Ot by means of a rule that satis¯es minimal rights
¯rst. Then, the property is not preserved under the composition of Ot and
Om. These observations are direct consequences of Theorem 6.
4. Convexity operator. We conclude with the convexity operator, for
which no particular remarks need be made. It preserves quite a few prop-
erties, but not several important ones. We simply refer to Table 2 for the
complete list.
6 Conclusion
Concerning the extent to which the operators preserve properties, we can
o®er no strict ranking, but only an informal observation that of the four op-
erators, the convexity operator tends to be the least disruptive. Also, due to
the duality between the claims truncation and attribution of minimal rights
operators, these two operators are equivalent in that regard. Switching our
focus from operators to properties, here no easy generalization can be made:
punctual properties (properties of rules that apply to each point in their
domain separately, such as order preservation) do not seem to be preserved
more frequently than relational properties (properties of rules that relate the
choices they make for problems that are related in some way, such as resource
monotonicity). A similar statement can be made about the ¯xed-population
properties as compared to the variable-population properties.
21Prop noperators convexity duality truncation min rights trunc ± min rights
Equal treat of equals + + + + +
Order pres + + + + +
Anonymity + + + + +
Group order pres + + ¡ (P) ¡ (P) ¡ (P)
Continuity + + + + +
Claims mon + ¡ (Prop 3) + ¡ (Prop 4) ¡ (Prop 7)
Resource mon + + ¡ (CEL) (Prop 6) ¡ (CEA) ¡ (CEA)
Homogeneity + + + + +
Claims trunc inv + ¡ (CEA) + + +
Min rights ¯rst + ¡(CEL) + + +
Comp down ¡ (Av) ¡ (ESu) (Prop 2) ¡ (P) ¡ (P) ¡ (CEA)
Comp up ¡ (Av) ¡(ESu) (Prop 2) ¡ (P) ¡ (P) ¡ (CEA)
Self-duality + + ¡ (P) ¡ (P) + (Cor 1)
No adv trans + + ¡ (P) ¡ (P) ¡ (P)
Pop mon + ¡ (Prop 5) + ¡ (CEA) ¡ (CEA)
Repli inv + + ¡ (P) ¡ (P) ¡ (P)
Consistency ¡ (Av) + ¡ (P) ¡ (P) ¡ (P)
Conv cons ¡ (Av) + ¡ (P) ¡ (P) ¡ (P)
Table 2: Showing which properties are preserved under the operators.
In each cell for which a negative result holds, we indicate in parenthesis a rule
allowing to prove the assertion. For instance, the notation (P) at the intersection
of the row labelled \group order preservation" and column labelled \truncation"
means that P satis¯es the property but that Pt does not.
22APPENDIX
In this appendix, we provide the proofs of selected results presented in Ta-
ble 2. We use the following additional notation. Given x1;x2;:::;xk 2 RN,
seg[x1;x2] denotes the segment connecting them and seg]x1;x2] ´ seg[x1;x2]n
fx1g; also bro:seg[x1;x2;:::;xk] ´ seg[x1;x2][seg[x2;x3][:::[seg[xk¡1;xk].
Proposition 2 The following properties are not preserved under the duality
operator but they come in dual pairs: invariance under claims truncation and
minimal rights ¯rst; composition down and composition up.
For the proof of the second part of this proposition, we use the following
\equal sacri¯ce rule" (Young, 1988; Moulin, 2000a). Let u:R ! R be the
function de¯ned by u(x) ´ ¡1
x and ESu the rule that selects for each (c;E) 2
CN the vector x 2 X(c;E) such that for each pair fi;jg µ N, u(ci)¡u(xi) =
u(cj) ¡ u(xj). (This is equivalent to setting xi =
ci
1+¯ci, where ¯ 2 R+ is
chosen so as to achieve e±ciency.)
Proof: The duality between invariance under claims truncation and mini-
mal rights ¯rst is proved by Herrero (1998) (Dagan, 1996, proves a related
result).
Minimal rights ¯rst: CEL can be used to make the point. One can also
appeal to the example used to prove that invariance under claims truncation
is not preserved and to the fact that this property and minimal rights ¯rst
are dual properties.
Composition down: We assert ¯rst that ESu satis¯es composition down.
To see this, let (c;E) 2 CN be given and E0 < E. Let x ´ ESu(c;E),
x0 ´ ESu(c;E0), and y ´ ESu(x;E0). We show that x0 = y. Let i 2 N. Let
¯x 2 R+ be such that
P ci
1+¯xci = E. Let ¯x0 and ¯y be similarly de¯ned. By
de¯nition of ESu, xi =
ci
1+¯xci and yi =
xi







i = E0 and ¯x0 is uniquely determined, ¯x0 = ¯y + ¯x. Thus,
x0
i = yi, as announced.
Next, we assert that (ESu)d violates composition down. Let N ´ f1;2g,
(c;E) 2 CN be de¯ned by (c;E) ´ (1;3; 68




7 ) and (ESu)d(c;E0) = (1
2; 9
4). Let c0 ´ (2
3; 18
7 ) and
x ´ (ESu)d(c0;E0). We claim that x 6= (1
2; 9
4). Suppose that x = (1
2; 9
4).
Since x ´ c0 ¡ (ESu)(c0;
P
c0
i ¡ E0), then (ESu)(c0;
P
c0
i ¡ E0) = (1
6; 9
28). Let












i ¡ E0. We
obtain ¯ = 9
2 but also 49
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Figure 3: Claims-monotonicity is not preserved under the duality op-
erator (Proposition 3). (a) Sample paths of awards of the rule S de¯ned in the
proof. (b) Paths p(Sd;c¤) and p(Sd;c¤¤). If the amount to divide is E, as agent 1's




2, he receives less (follow the arrows).
The duality between the two composition properties is proved by Moulin
(2000a). ¤
Our next result concerns claims monotonicity, a property that is satis¯ed
by every rule encountered in the literature.19 Unfortunately we have:
Proposition 3 Claims monotonicity is not preserved under the duality op-
erator.
The proof is by means of an example. It is of interest that the example
is anonymous, order-preserving, homogeneous, and resource monotonic (and
therefore resource continuous; it is in fact fully continuous, that is, jointly
continuous with respect to the claims and the amount to divide). This shows
that these properties do not help preserve claims monotonicity.
Proof: We de¯ne a rule S on CN, where N ´ f1;2g. The rule is depicted
in Figures 3 and 4. We show that S is claims monotonic whereas Sd is not.
Let a > 0, c ´ (0;a), c¤ ´ (a
4;a), c¤¤ ´ (a
2;a), and ¹ c ´ (a;a). We
¯rst specify p(S;c) for each c 2 seg[c;¹ c]. We then choose p(S;c) for each
c 2 seg[(a;0);¹ c] as the symmetric image with respect to the 45± line of
p(S;(c2;c1)). Finally, we choose p(S;c) for each other c 2 R2
+ by ¯rst calcu-
lating ¹ such that ¹c 2 bro:seg[(a;0);¹ c;(0;a)] and subjecting p(S;¹c) to a
19Here too, few of the standard rules satisfy the stronger requirement that an agent
whose claim increases should receive more, unless E = 0 of course (equality is not permit-
ted any more). The rule P is a rare example that does. However, it is easy to construct
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Figure 4: The rule S of Proposition 3 is claims monotonic. Sample paths
p(S;c) for c ´ (c1;a) when c1 2 [0;1[. The path p(S;c) for each c 2 seg[(a;0);¹ c],
where ¹ c ´ (a;a), is obtained by symmetry from the path for the symmetric image
of c with respect to the 45± line. The paths for two critical claims vectors, ¹ c¤ and
¹ c¤¤, the symmetric images of c¤ and c¤¤, are represented. The path p(S;c) for each
c 2 J3[J2[J1 is obtained by homothetic expansion of the path for the homothetic
image of c that belongs to seg[(a;0);¹ c]. For each amount to divide, as agent 1's
claim increases, he receives at least as much as he did initially.
homothetic transformation of ratio 1
¹. This construction guarantees that S
is anonymous and homogeneous.
For each c 2 I1 ´ seg[c;c¤] (see Figure 3a for illustrations of I1 and I2 and
I3 de¯ned below), p(S;c) = p(CEL;c). For each c 2 I2 ´ seg]c¤;c¤¤], p(S;c)
is piecewise linear in two pieces: given 0 · ¸ · 1, p(S;¸c¤ + (1 ¡ ¸)c¤¤) =
bro:seg[(0;0);¸(0; 3
4a);¸c¤ + (1 ¡ ¸)c¤¤]. (Note that for ¸ = 0, the path is
that of P.) For each c 2 I3 ´ seg]c¤¤;¹ c], p(S;c) = p(P;c).
Figure 4 illustrates that when agent 2's claim is ¯xed at a, and as agent 1's
claim increases from 0 to 1, agent 1's award does not decrease. The claims
monotonicity of S is a consequence of this fact and of its being anonymous
and homogeneous. The ¯gure indicates some paths p(S;c) for c 2 RN
+ with
c2 = a. We show that these paths never cross. Given any claims vector c of
the form c ´ (c1;a) for c1 2 [a;1[, there is a claims vector on seg[(a;0);¹ c]
that is proportional to it. We call ¹ ¸ 1 the expansion factor required to
pass from the latter to the former, using the same superscript to keep track
of this pairing, ¹ c¤ and ¹¤¹ c¤ being an example of a pair so de¯ned.
1. For each c 2 J3 ´ seg]¹ c;¹¤¤¹ c¤¤] (again, see Figure 4), where ¹ c¤¤ is
25the symmetric image of c¤¤, p(S;c) = p(P;c) (examples are p(S;¹1c1) and
p(S;¹2c2)).
2. For each c 2 J2 ´ seg]¹¤¤¹ c¤¤;¹¤¹ c¤], p(S;c) is obtained by a homothetic
expansion of the path for the reduced image of c that belongs to seg[(a;0);¹ c].
For example, consider two points in J2, such as ¹3c3 and ¹4c4 in the ¯gure,
where ¹4c4 is to the right of ¹3c3. Then, the paths for these points are
obtained by homothetic expansions of the paths for c3 and c4, with c4 below
c3. The slope of the oblique segment in p(S;c4) is greater than the slope of
the oblique segment in p(S;c3). Therefore the same statement can be made
about the slopes of the oblique segments in p(S;¹4c4) and p(S;¹3c3), which
imply that they do not cross.
3. Finally, for each c 2 J1 ´ f(c1;a):c1 2 ]4a;1[g (J1 is the open half-line
f¹¤¹ c¤ + t(1;0):t > 0g in the ¯gure), p(S;c) consists of a horizontal segment
from the origin and a segment of slope 1.
The fact that Sd violates claims monotonicity can be seen by considering
p(Sd;c¤) and p(Sd;c¤¤). These paths are obtained by symmetry of p(S;c¤)
and p(S;c¤¤). Inspection of Figure 3b reveals that the paths cross: in fact,
for each amount to divide in the interval ]0; 3





2, agent 2's claim being kept ¯xed at a. ¤
The strengthening of claims monotonicity obtained by requiring that if
an agent's claim increases, he should receive more, is not preserved under the
duality operator either. To see this, it su±ces to modify the example used
to prove Proposition 3. Informally, for each c 2 I1 [ I2, replace the vertical
segment of p(S;c) by a very steep segment whose slope varies continuously
and monotonically between 1 and 2 as c varies in I1 [ I2 from c to c¤¤.
Proposition 4 Claims monotonicity is not preserved under the attribution
of minimal rights operator.
We prove this result by exhibiting a rule that is claims monotonic, but
once subjected to Om, it is not. Although the assertion can be proved by
means of the example used to prove Proposition 7, we exhibit here a rule
that is order preserving, anonymous, resource monotonic, and continuous.
Proof: The proof is by means of an example of a rule S de¯ned on CN where
N ´ f1;2g. It is depicted in Figure 5a.
Step 1: Construction of S. We ¯rst consider c 2 RN
+ with c1 · c2. If




























E = 2 1
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(b)
Figure 5: Claims monotonicity is not preserved under the attribution
of minimal rights operator (Proposition 4.) (a) Sample paths of awards of
the rule S de¯ned in the proof. The path for c in the shaded region is a linear
combination of p(P;c) and p(CEL;c). (b) Paths p(Sm;c) and p(Sm;c0). If E = 2,
as agent 1's claim increases from 1 to 2, he receives less.
2 < c2 < 4 (the shaded region), then p(S;c) is a linear combination of
p(P;c) and p(CEL;c). The construction uses an arbitrary continuous and
monotone function g:[0;1] ! [0;1] such that for each t 2 [0;1], g(t) · t, and
g(0) = 0, g(1
2) = 1
4, and g(1) = 1. Now, let k(c) ´ g(
c2¡2
2 )(c2 ¡ c1), and
p(S;c) ´ bro:seg[(0;0);(0;k(c));c].
We then choose p(S;c) for each c 2 RN
+ with c1 > c2 as the symmetric
image with respect to the 45± line of p(S;(c2;c1)). This guarantees that S is
anonymous.
Step 2: S is claims monotonic. Since S is anonymous, it is enough to ex-
amine the rule in the region fc 2 RN
+:c1 · c2g. First, let c2 > 0 and let
c1;c0
1 2 [0;c2] be such that c0
1 < c1. Let c0
2 ´ c2 and c0 ´ (c0
1;c0
2). There are
three subcases. If c2 · 2, then p(S;c) = p(P;c) and p(S;c0) = p(P;c0), and
since P satis¯es claims monotonicity, we are done. If c2 ¸ 4, then p(S;c) =
p(CEL;c) and p(S;c0) = p(CEL;c0), and since CEL satis¯es claims mono-
tonicity, we are done. If 2 < c2 < 4, then p(S;c) = bro:seg[(0;0);(0;k(c));c].
Also, p(S;c0) = bro:seg[(0;0);(0;k(c0);c0]. The conclusion follows from the
fact that c2 ¡ c1 < c0
2 ¡ c0
1, and since c0
2 = c2, g(
c2¡2
2 ) = g(
c0
2¡2
2 ), so that
altogether k(c) ´ g(
c2¡2






Next, let c1 > 0 and let c2;c0
2 2 [c1;1[ be such that c2 < c0
2. Let
c0
1 ´ c1 and c0 ´ (c0
1;c0
2). We have p(S;c) = bro:seg[(0;0);(0;k(c));c]; also,
p(S;c0) = bro:seg[(0;0);(0;k(c0));c0]. The conclusion follows from the fact
that since c0
2 > c2 and c0
1 = c1, then c2 ¡ c1 < c0
2 ¡ c0
1, and since g is
increasing, g(
c2¡2
2 ) · g(
c0
2¡2
2 ), so that altogether k(c) ´ g(
c2¡2







27Step 3: Sm is not claims monotonic (Figure 5b). To see this, let c ´ (1;4),
c0 ´ (2;4), and E = 2. Note that m(c;E) = (0;1) and m(c0;E) = (0;0).
We have Sm(c;E) = m(c;E) + S(c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
P
mi(c;E)). Let c¤ ´
c¡m(c;E). To calculate the second term in this sum, we note that c¤ = (1;3)
and E¡
P









2 ) = g(1
2) = 1





2 < 1 = E ¡
P
mi(c;E). So, S1(c¤;E ¡
P
mi(c;E)) > 0. This implies
Sm
1 (c;E) > 0. Also, Sm
1 (c0;E) = S1(c0;E) = CEL1(c0;E) = 0. Thus, as
agent 1's claim increases from c1 = 1 to c0
1 = 2, he receives less, in violation
of claims monotonicity. ¤
Next, we turn to population monotonicity for which a negative result
also holds. We prove this fact by exhibiting a rule S that is anonymous,
homogeneous, and resource monotonic, and population monotonic but Sd is
not population monotonic. (Since resource monotonicity implies resource
continuity, S is also resource continuous):
Proposition 5 Population monotonicity is not preserved under the duality
operator.
Proof: The proof is by means of an example of a rule S de¯ned on
S
N0µN CN0
where N ´ f1;2;3g. Sample paths of awards of S are plotted in Figures 6a
and 6b. We show that S is population monotonic but Sd is not.
Step 1: Construction of S. On the subdomain of two-claimant problems,
S ´ P. Let Q be the unit cube in RN
+, and for each t 2 f1;2;3g, let Ft
be the face of Q consisting of all c 2 RN
+ such that ct = 1. Given c ´
(c1;1;c3) 6= (1;1;1), a typical claims vector in F2, let L be the line passing
through c and e ´ (1;1;1). Also, let x ´ L \ seg[(2
3;1;1);(1;1; 2
3)] and
y ´ L \ seg[(0;1;1);(1;1;0)] (we use the notation L0, x0, y0 for the claims
vector c0). If 0 < c1 + c3 · 1, then p(S;c) = p(P;c) (c in Figure 6a). If 1 <
c1+c3 · 1+ 2
3, then p(S;c) = bro:seg[(0;0;0);y;c] (c0 in Figure 6a). If 1+ 2
3 <
c1 + c3 · 2, then p(S;c) is piecewise linear in two pieces de¯ned as follows:
let 0 · ¸ · 1 be such that c = ¸x+(1¡¸)e. Then p(S;c) = seg[(0;0;0);d;c]
where d ´ ¸y+(1¡¸)2
3e (Figure 6b). Finally, if c = e, then p(S;c) = p(P;c).
We deduce p(S;c) for each c 2 F1 by symmetry with respect to the plane of
equation x1 = x2 of p(S;c0) where c0 is symmetric image of c with respect
to that plane; similarly we deduce p(S;c) for each c 2 F3 by symmetry with
28respect to the plane of equation x2 = x3 of p(S;c0) where c0 is the symmetric
image of c with respect to that plane. If c is not in any of the faces F1, F2,
and F3, let ¹ 2 R+ be such that ¹c does belong to such a face. Then, p(S;c)
is obtained from p(S;¹c) by the homothetic transformation of ratio 1
¹. This
construction guarantees that S is anonymous and homogeneous.
Step 2: S is population monotonic. Let E > 0 and c ´ (c1;1;c3) be an
arbitrary point in F2. We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: 0 < c1 + c3 · 1. Then, S(c;E) ´ P (c;E). Since S(cN0;E) ´
P(cN0;E) for each N0 with jN0j = 2 and P is population monotonic, the
population-monotonicity inequalities hold.
Case 2: 1 < c1 + c3 · 1 + 2
3. We imagine the departure of each agent in
turn (Figure 6c).





. We assume that E · 1 + c3 since otherwise there is
nothing to check. Since y = L \ seg[(0;1;1);(1;1;0)], then y1 + 1 + y3 = 2.
Note that y belongs to the simplex in the plane of equation
P





















c3 ¸ y3 and 1 + c3 · 2, then z0
3 ¡ z3 ¸ 0.
Also z0
2 ¡ z2 = E
1+c3 ¡ E
2 . Since 1 + c3 · 2, then z0
2 ¡ z2 ¸ 0.





. We assume that E · c1 + c3 since otherwise there is
nothing to check. Since y = L \ seg[(0;1;1);(1;1;0)], as already calculated,




















2 . Since c1 ¸ y1 and c1 + c3 · 2, then z0






2 . Since c3 ¸ y3 and c1+c3 · 2, then z0
3¡z3 ¸ 0.
Subcase 2.3: Claimant 3 leaves. We apply the same argument as in Sub-
case 2.1.
Case 3: 1 + 2
3 < c1 + c3 · 2. Let ¸ be such that c = ¸x + (1 ¡ ¸)e and
d ´ ¸y + (1 ¡ ¸)2
3e. Since x ¸ y and e > 2
3e, then c ¸ d.





. We assume that E · 1 + c3 since otherwise there is























Since c3 ¸ d3 and 1 + c3 · 2, then z0























































c = (1;1; 1
2)
path of awards













Figure 6: Population monotonicity is not preserved under the duality
operator (Proposition 5). (a) Construction of p(S;c) for c such that c2 = 1 and
0 · c1+c3 · 1, and for c0 such that c0




of p(S;c) for c such that c2 = 1 and 1+ 2
3 < c1+c3 · 2. (c) The rule S is population
monotonic. Given c in F2, we determine p(S;c) (it consists of two line segments),
and the paths of awards of S for each of the projections of c onto the three two-
dimensional coordinates subspaces (these paths are segments connecting the origin
to these projections). Then, given E, we calculate the awards vectors selected by
S for the resulting problems. (d) The rule Sd is not population monotonic. For
(c;E) ´ (1;1; 1
2; 1
2), it selects (0;0; 1
2), but for the problem that results from the
departure of claimant 2, it selects (1
3; 1
6). Claimant 3 loses.
30Also, z0
2 ¡ z2 = E
1+c3 ¡
d2E
2 . Since 1 ¸ d2 and 1 + c3 · 2, z0
2 ¡ z2 ¸ 0.





. We assume that E · c1 + c3 since otherwise there is























Since c1 ¸ d1 and c1 + c3 · 2, then z0






2 . Since c3 ¸ d3 and c1+c3 · 2, then z0
3¡z3 ¸ 0.
Subcase 3.3: Claimant 3 leaves. We apply the same argument as in Sub-
case 3.1.







We have p(S;c) = bro:seg[(0;0;0);(1;1;0);(1;1; 1
2)]. The path p(Sd;c) is
obtained from p(S;c) by symmetry with respect to c
2. Thus, p(Sd;c) =
bro:seg[(0;0;0);(0;0; 1
2);(1;1; 1











































Since claimant 3 receives less in the two-claimant problem than in the three-
claimant problem, Sd violates population monotonicity. ¤
Proposition 6 Resource monotonicity is not preserved under the claims
truncation operator.
Proof: The rule CEL satis¯es the property but CELt does not. To see this,




3 ). However, for E0 ´ 20, we obtain CELt(c;E0) =
(0;10;10). Claimant 1 loses when the amount to divide increases from E
to E0.
Since for jNj = 2, CELt coincides with CD, which is resource monotonic,
this negative result can be proved by means of CEL only with an example
involving at least three claimants. However, rules can be constructed to make
the point that the property is not preserved under the claims truncation
operator for jNj = 2. Any such rule has to fail claims monotonicity, a
property that CEL satis¯es. The proof is by means of an example S. Let
c ´ (4;7), c0 ´ (4;6), p(S;c) ´ bro:seg[(0;0);(3:5;3:5);c], and p(S;c0) ´
bro:seg[(0;0);(2;4);c0]. Both of these paths are monotone, and to obtain a
resource monotonic rule it su±ces to choose p(S;~ c) to be a monotone path
























Figure 7: Claims monotonicity is not preserved under the composi-
tion of the claims truncation and attribution of minimal rights operator
(Proposition 7). (a) Sample paths of awards of the rule S de¯ned in the proof.
(b) Showing that S is claims monotonic.
but St(c;E0) = S(t(c;E0);E0) = S(c0;E0) = (2;4). Claimant 2 loses when
the amount to divide increases from E0 to E.
¤
Proposition 7 Claims monotonicity is not preserved under the composition
of the claims truncation and attribution of minimal rights operators.
The proof is by means of an example of a rule, called S. The rule is
claims continuous and resource monotonic. It violates both equal treatment
of equals and homogeneity but this is unavoidable. Indeed, as shown in The-
orem 3, if a rule R de¯ned on CN for jNj = 2 satis¯es equal treatment of
equals, then Rt±m = Rm±t = CD. Since CD is claims monotonic, then S vi-
olates equal treatment of equals. In addition, still for jNj = 2, the \weighted
concede-and-divide rules" are the only rules satisfying homogeneity, invari-
ance under claims truncation, and minimal rights ¯rst (Hokari and Thomson,
2003). Since these rules are claims monotonic, then S violates homogeneity.
However, we design S to be claims continuous and resource monotonic. An
ingredient of our construction is the \sequential priority rule associated with
the order 2 Á 1," denoted D2Á1, which, as the amount to divide increases
from 0, assigns all of it to claimant 2 until he is fully compensated, and only
then starts compensating claimant 1. Claims monotonicity of S means that
the paths of awards associated with two claims vectors that di®er in only one
coordinate do not cross.
Proof: We de¯ne a rule S on CN, where N ´ f1;2g. We show that S is
claims monotonic whereas St±m is not.
32Step 1: Construction of S (Figure 7a). Let c 2 RN
+. If c2 · 1, then
p(S;c) = p(P;c). If c2 ¸ 2, p(S;c) = p(D2Á1;c). If 1 < c2 < 2, then
p(S;c) = bro:seg[(0;0);(0;2(c2 ¡ 1));c]. (Thus, for each c1 2 R+, and as
c2 increases from 1 to 2, p(S;c) changes continuously from p(P;(c1;1)) to
p(D2Á1;(c1;2)).) The ¯rst case is illustrated by c1 and c2, the second case by
c5, c6, and c7, and the third case by c3 and c4.
Step 2: S is claims monotonic (Figure 7b). Let c;c0 2 RN
+ be such that
c0
2;c2 · 1. Then the paths of awards of S for c and c0 are that of the
proportional rule, and since this rule satis¯es claims monotonicity, we are
done. If c0
2;c2 ¸ 2, then the paths of awards of S for c and c0 are that
of D2Á1, and since this rule satis¯es claims monotonicity, we are done. If
c0
1 > c1, c0
2 = c2, and 1 < c2 < 2, then p(S;c) = bro:seg[(0;0);(0;2(c2¡1));c].
Also, p(S;c0) = bro:seg[(0;0);(0;2(c0
2 ¡ 1));c0]. Since c0
1 > c1 and c0
2 = c2,
the two paths begin with the same vertical segment. The second segment of
p(S;c0) is °atter than the second segment of p(S;c). Thus, the paths do not
cross.
Next, let c;c0 2 RN
+ be such that c0
1 = c1 and c0
2 > c2. When 1 ·
c2 < c0
2 · 2, then p(S;c) = bro:seg[(0;0);(0;2(c2 ¡ 1));c] and p(S;c0) =
bro:seg[(0;0);(0;2(c0
2 ¡ 1));c0]. Since 2(c2 ¡ 1) < 2(c0
2 ¡ 1), these paths do
not cross. The desired conclusion for the other cases follows directly from
the facts that the proportional and constrained equal losses rules are claims
monotonic, and that S is continuous.
Step 3: Sm±t is not claims monotonic. To see this, let c ´ (1;4), c0 ´ (3;4),
and E = 2. By Step 1 in Theorem 4, m(t(c;E);E) = m(c;E). Thus,
Sm±t(c;E) = m(c;E) + S(t(c;E) ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
P
i2N mi(c;E)). Note that
m(c;E) = (0;1), t(c;E) = (1;2), m(c0;E) = (0;0), and t(c0;E) = (2;2). It
follows that Sm±t(c;E) = (1
2; 3
2) and Sm±t(c0;E) = (0;2). Thus, as agent 1's
claim increases from c1 = 1 to c0
1 = 3, he receives less, in violation of claims
monotonicity. ¤
The rule de¯ned in this proof can also be used to show that claims mono-
tonicity is not preserved under Om (to see this, set c ´ (1;4), E ´ 4, and
c0 ´ (2;4)), but examples can be constructed to prove this fact that are
anonymous.
33References
Aumann, R. and M. Maschler, \Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy
problem from the Talmud", Journal of Economic Theory 36 (1985),
195-213.
Chambers, C. and W. Thomson, \Group order preservation and the propor-
tional rule for bankruptcy problems", Mathematical Social Sciences 44
(2002), 235-252.
Chun, Y., \Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems", International
Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999), 511-520.
Chun, Y and W. Thomson, \Convergence under replication of rules to adju-
dicate con°icting claims", Games and Economic Behavior 50 (2005),
129-142.
Curiel, I., M. Maschler and S.H. Tijs, \Bankruptcy games", Zeitschrift fÄ ur
Operations Research 31 (1987), A143-A159.
Dagan, N.,\New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules", Social Choice
and Welfare 13 (1996), 51-59.
Herrero, C., \Minimal rights in claims problems", University of Alicante,
1998.
Herrero, C. and A. Villar, \The three musketeers: four classical solutions to
bankruptcy problems", Mathematical Social Sciences 39 (2001), 307-
328.
|| and ||, \Sustainability in bankruptcy problems", T.O.P. 10 (2002),
261-273.
Hokari, T. and W. Thomson, \Claims problems and weighted generalizations
of the Talmud rule", Economic Theory 21 (2003), 241-261.
Ju, B.-G., E. Miyagawa and T. Sakai, \A full characterization of non-
manipulable division rules in claims problems and generalizations",
mimeo, 2004, Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
O'Neill, B., \A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud", Mathematical
Social Sciences 2 (1982), 345-371.
Moulin, H., \Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods",
International Journal of Game Theory 16 (1987), 161-186.
||, \Priority rules and other asymmetric rationing methods", Economet-
rica 68 (2000a), 643-684.
||, Oral presentation, Bilbao, 2000b.
Piniles, H.M., Darkah shel Torah, 1861, Forester, Vienna.
Thomson, W., \The fair division of a ¯xed supply among a growing popula-
34tion", Mathematics of Operations Research 8 (1983), 319-326.
||, \Population-monotonic allocation rules", Chapter 4 in Social Choice,
Welfare, and Ethics (W. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles and N. Scho¯eld,
eds) Cambridge University Press, 1995, 79-124.
||, Theory of Fair Allocation, book manuscript, 1998.
|| \Two families of solutions for the resolution of con°icting claims",
mimeo, 2000.
||, \Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation
problems: a survey", Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003), 249-297.
||, \Consistent allocation rules", mimeo, 2005a.
||, \How to divide when there isn't enough", mimeo, 2005b.
Young, P., \On dividing an amount according to individual claims or liabil-
ities", Mathematics of Operations Research 12 (1987), 398-414.
||, \Distributive justice in taxation", Journal of Economic Theory 48
(1988), 321-335.
35